Introduction
The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 1947 (GATT 1947 ) Uruquay Round Negotiation (1986 -1994 As a part of international law relating to the international trade regulation 2 , the WTO Agreement should be well implemented and obeyed by it's members. The main dominant factor of the implementation and the compliance with the WTO Agreement is the enforcement system and mechanism. The WTO Agreement (WTO Laws) should be well enforced against any breach and violation. Any breach and violation of the WTO Law can raise disputes among the WTO members. For this reason, regulation of WTO dispute settlement become very important element in the WTO laws enforcement. John H. Jackson et al, said that dispute settlement system and mechanism become central elements of WTO/GATT. 3 The WTO dispute settlement system and mechanism is regulated under the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settllement of Disputes or oftenly known as Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Basically, the DSU constitute improvements of the GATT 1947 (the WTO predecessor) dispute settlement regulation (Article XXII dan Article XXIII GATT 1947) . Under the DSU, WTO Dispute Settlement Body (WTO DSB) was established to handle WTO disputes. The WTO DSB has two organs, namely Panels and Appellate Body.
Under the DSU, principle of otomation is applied in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Based on the otomation principle, the procedure of WTO dispute settlement will prevail in settling a dispute and the parties to the dispute shall follow the process and the procedure sequently. The decision (rulings and recommendations) of the WTO DSB in a dispute settlement is automatically binding and must be performed by the losing respondent.
The binding character of the WTO DSB's decision in a dispute settlement can be concluded from Article 17 paragraph (14) of the DSU, which stated, "An Appelate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties to disputes unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appeallate Body report within 30 days following the circulation to the Members." The parties to the dispute are bound by the WTO DSB's decision (rulings and recommendations) in the particular case and they have obligation to implement and obey the decision. 4 No longer than 30 days after the adoption of Panel/Appellate Body report by the WTO DSB, the losing respondent (the party which has obligation to perform), shall to inform the WTO DSB about it's willingness to implement and perform the decision. 5 Eventhough has a binding character and must be performed, in some cases the WTO DSB's decisions were not obeyed and perfomed by the losing respondent. This happened toward decision of the WTO DSB in the dumping case (DS312) between Indonesia (as complainant) and South Korea (as respondent) and in the cigarette case (DS481) between Indonesia (as complainant) and the United States (as respondent). The WTO DSB's decision in those two cases were in Indonesia favor, but South Korea Without any sanction and the absence of WTO body which has authority to give sanctions against the non compliance with the DSB's decision, can raise a problem of legally binding of the WTO DSB's decision. According to some writers WTO DSB's decision (rulings and recommendation) is not binding based on law, but is binding based on morality. For instance, Judith H. Bello said that the WTO DSB's decision has no legal binding and the obligation to obey and perform is voluntary by the WTO members. The WTO has no enforcement body, such as police, prosecutors, bail and jail for the pupose of DSB WTO's decison enforcement. 6 Judith H. Bello's opinion/ argumentation was criticized by John H. Jackson. According to John H. Jackson, WTO DSB's decision (rulings and recommendations) is legally binding and raise an obligation based on international law to the parties in the dispute to implement and obey. 7 Based on the controversy, this paper will analyse the legally binding of the WTO DSB's rulings and recommendations, it's impact to the WTO laws enforcement and the solution to improve the WTO judicial dispute settlement system.
DSB WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism
Since 1 January 1995 to the midle of August 2016, the total number of WTO disputes registered at the WTO Secretariat was 509. 8 WTO disputes shall be settled by the WTO DSB based on mechanism and procedures of the DSU.
Process of WTO disputes settlement is started with a consultation between the parties to the dispute (complainant and respondent). Consultation in the WTO dispute settlement is a negotiation by the parties to the dispute to settle the dispute base on the agreement between them. The consultation shall have be done after 30 days (for a particular case 10 days) since the request to do consultation made by the complaining party. The maximum period of time to do concultation is 60 days.
If the consultation failed to settle the dispute, the complaining party can make a request to the DSB to establish a Panel. The respondent has the right to reject the request of establishing WTO Panel one time. And afterward, the complaining party can request the establishment of Panel for the second time, and based on this request WTO DSB will automatically establih a Panel, unless the establishment of a panel by consensus is not agreed by all of WTO members. Usually, WTO Panel comprises of three persons, elected from WTO members which their state have no direct interest to the dispute. The parties to the dispute have a right to reject the panel if there is an indication that the panel will not be neutral panel. 9 The Panel's members have to do their job in their own capacity and they can not accept any instruction from their governments. In examining and make Panel's report, the WTO Panel will get assistance from some officers of the WTO Secretariat.
The WTO Panel shall examine the fact of the dispute, all of any legal summaries made by both parties, hear all of direct orally explanations from both parties, and the laws and regulations that can be applied to settle the dispute. After the examination of the dispute, the WTO Panel shall make conclusions and adopt a report (decision). The time for Panel to examinine and adopt a report is six months, maximum in nine months.
Before the report is adopted, Panel shall to circulate to the parties to the dispute for getting comments, and based on the comments Panel can make some improvements. The final report of WTO Panel is delivered to the WTO DSB, and the WTO DSB will adopt the Panel's report become the DSB's decision (rulings and recommendations), unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of it's decision to appeal or the DSB by consensus not to adopt the report.
If a party to the dispute notify the DSB on it's decision to appeal the Panel report, the WTO Appellate Body shall examine any claim of mistake in applying the laws and regulations in the Panel's report. The WTO Appelate Body shall adopt a report on the dispute in 60 days. The WTO Appellate Body's report will be adopted by WTO DSB become the DSB's decision (rulings and recommendations) within 30 days following its circulation to the Members, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.
The decision (rulings and recommendations) of the DSB WTO unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute and shall be performed. Concerning with the final and binding character of the DSB decision, Robert Reed stated that once a Final or Appelate Body Report has been adopted by the DSB, its recommendation and rulings become binding on the parties to a dispute and the losing respondent is required to brings its trade regime into compliance with the WTO rules. 10 The implementation of the WTO DSB's decision (rulings and recommendations) shall be done voluntary by the parties to the dispute based on their commitment to obey all of WTO laws and decisions when they became members of the WTO. Article 3 paragraph (1) of the DSU stated, "Members affirm their adherence to the principles for the management of disputes heretofore applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947 , and the rules and procedures as further elaborated and modified herein." To keep the implementation of the WTO DSB decision, the DSU govern the procedure of the DSB decision implementation under the title of "Surveillance The reasonable period of time can be proposed by the Member concerned or determined by the agreement made by the parties to the dispute or determined by the decision made by arbitration.
Concerning with the surveillance of the WTO DSB decision in "the Hand Book on the WTO Dispute Settlement System" is stated: "The DSB keeps implementation by a Member of its recommendations or rulings (in other words the implementation of adopted panel (and Appellate Body) reports) under surveillance." 11 For the purpose of surveillance of the WTO DSB rulings and recommendations implementation, Article 21 paragraph (6) of DSU stated:
"The DSB shall keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings. The issue of implementation of the recommendations or rulings may be raised at the DSB by any Member at any time following their adoption. Unless the DSB decides otherwise, the issue of implementation of the recommendations or rulings shall be placed on the agenda of the DSB meeting after six months following the date of establishment of the reasonable period of time pursuant to paragraph 3 and shall remain on the DSB's agenda until the issue is resolved. At least 10 days prior to each such DSB meeting, the Member concerned shall provide the DSB with a status report in writing of its progress in the implementation of the recommendations or rulings."
Based on the provisions it also can be concluded that the WTO DSB decision in a dispute settlement raise an obligation to the parties in the dispute to obey and implement the decision. 12
In the case of there was no implementation of the WTO DSB decision (rulings and recomendations) in the reasonable period of time, the Member concerned can make a negotiation of trade compensation within 20 days. Concerning with the negotiation of trade compensation, Article 22 paragraph (2) of the DSU stated:
"... If no satisfactory compensation has been agreed within 20 days after the date of expire of the reasonable period of time, any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreement."
Compensation and suspension of concession as a solution in the WTO dispute settlement is temporary and is not a permanent solution. The parties to the dispute are able to make agreement on suspension of consession in a reasonable period of time. If there was no agreed reasonable period of time, the Member concerned can bring the dispute to the arbitration. 13 In case if the WTO DSB decision (rulings and recommendations) was not obeyed and performed by the losing party, the Member concerned (the wining party) has a right to do trade retaliation against the losing party. Based on the Article 22 paragraph (1) of the DSU, the trade retaliation shall be done at the same sector/product (parallel retaliation). If parallel trade retaliation did not work well, retaliation at the different sector/product (cross retaliation) can be done by the Member concerned. 14 As a measure of WTO DSB decision enforcement, the trade retaliation is not sufficient and effective.
Concerning the weakness of the trade retaliation as a sanction against the noncompliance with the WTO DSB rulings and recommendation, Karen J. The WTO does not provide any other sanctions against the non compliance with the WTO DSB decision other than trade retaliation. The WTO also has no organ or body of enforcement of the WTO laws and decisions, such as police force, prosecutors, bail and jail. 17 In some cases the wining parties in the WTO disputes settlement had to do measures of selfhelp to force the losing party in implementing the WTO DSB decision (rulings and recommendations).
The Legally Binding of the WTO DSB's Decision
Some writers said that based on the existence of the dispute settlement body, fixed procedure and the binding character of the decision, the WTO DSB dispute settlement system is a yudicial/adjudicatory dispute settlement system. 18 The WTO dispute 13 Ibid. 14 As a judicial decision, WTO DSB decision (rulings and recommendation) is legally binding based on the "judge made law theory" and secondary sources of international law theory in the meaning of Article 38 paragraph (1) Statute of the ICJ. As secondary sources of international law, judicial decision will be used by the ICJ judges when the primary sources of international law (international conventions/treties, international customary laws and general principles of law) can not be used in settling a dispute brought before the ICJ. 22
Most of the international law writers said that judicial decision will not prevail as general (universal) international law. Rebecca M. Wallace said, there is no stare decisis in international law, which based on the stare decisis principle the ICJ judges have obligation to follow the previous decision in settling similar (the same) case. Eventhough there is no stare decisis, the ICJ judges and other international courts/ tribunals, usually will see and make consideration base on the law which had been applied by the previous judges at the similar or same cases. As a judicial decision, WTO DSB decisions in a dispute settlement should be legally binding. Binding here means "something that must be obeyed". 26 Legally means based on law. 27 Legally binding of the WTO DSB decision means the binding force of the DSB decision based on the prevailing laws and regulations, so if there is no implementation and compliance with the decision can raise legal effect based on international law. Consequently, the non-compliance with the WTO DSB's decision raise a breach of international law and the non-compliance party can be sanctioned based on international law.
As have been discussed at the previous part of this paper, in some cases WTO DSB was not being performed and implemented, such as WTO DSB decisions in the dispute between Indonesia and South Korea and dispute between Indonesia and the United States in the different cases. Indonesia won in those two disputes, but South Korea and the United States as the losing parties did not performed and complied with the decision.
Due to the absence of sanctions and enforcement measures provided by the WTO Laws and regulations against the non-compliance with the WTO DSB's decision, in some cases the Member concerned (the wining party) to the dispute had to do measures of self-help by their own powers to force the losing respondent to implement the decisions. In those two cases involving Indonesia, as a developing country Indonesia has no enough power to force South Korea and the United Stated to implement the WTO DSB's decisions. Consequently, South Korea and the United States never be sanctioned over their non-compliance with the WTO DSB's decisions in those disputes.
Based on the facts, some writers said that even though the WTO DSB's decision is binding and can be regarded as judicial decision, the WTO DSB's decision have no executorial title. As a comparasion, some writers of international law make differences between hard law and soft law in the international law system using the criterion "binding" and "not binding". Based on the above analysis, due to the lack of legal sanctions and institution enforcement measures, both as judicial decision and as international organization decision, WTO DSB's decision (rulings and recommendations) can be interpreted as international soft law norms, not as international hard law norms. But this interpretation is not ideal for the WTO Laws enforcement and the implementation of the WTO Agreement as a part of international law concerning with international trade. Moreover, this interpretation is not in accordance with the goals of the WTO and the fact of WTO as an international treaty which has legal binding based on pacta sunt servanda principle.
Strengthening and Improving the WTO Judicial System
The WTO DSB judicial dispute settlement system has some weaknesses. The DSB WTO and its subsidiary organs, Panel and the Appellate Body, are not representing real judicial institutions such as a court or tribunal. As judicial organs of the WTO, Panel and the Appellate Body have no authority to make their independent and binding decision. The authority to make decision in WTO dispute settlement belong to the WTO DSB and the WTO DSB is not a judicial organ, but a political institutional. Consequently, the WTO DSB's decision in WTO dispute settlement can be regarded as decision of an international organization.
Moreover, concerning with the weakness of the WTO dispute settlement system, according to Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann said that both ad hoc arbitrators and WTO panelists often perceive themselves as 'agents' of the disputing parties mandated, inter alia, to 'give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution' (Article 11 DSU). In view of their limited mandates, and in contrast to members of 'courts of justice', ad hoc arbitrators and WTO panelists do not wear traditional 'robes of justice' and may not perceive themselves as 'judges.'" 38 Based on the statement, it is can be concluded that the political/diplomatic dispute settlement system still become the dominant factor in the WTO judicial dispute settlement system. As Petersmann said members of the WTO Panel oftently think that they are mediators representing the 35 Shaffer, G.C., and Pollack, M.A. (2010 interests of the parties to the dispute, and their duty is to make a solution for the dispute that can be accepted and sastified both parties to the dispute. WTO Panel members never act as judges of international court and not wear traditional robes of justice, due to their limited mandates in settling WTO disputes.
As judicial organs, the WTO Panel and Appellate Body should be given authority to make independent and binding decisions in WTO dispute settlement. As decision of judicial organs, WTO Panel's decision and Appellate Body's decision in WTO dispute settlement are not necessary to be circulated to all WTO Members, but it should be published and be delivered to the parties in the dispute.
Until now, the main weakness of the WTO judicial dispute settlement is the WTO has no body and sufficient means of enforcement in implementing the WTO DSB's decisions (rulings and recommendations). As Mark L. Movsesian said, "Still, WTO dispute settlement has drawn great criticism, much of it focusing on the new enforcement mechanism." Several commentators argue that the retaliation remedy is too weak and unpredictable to be of any real use, particularly in asymmetric disputes between large and small economies. These critics advocate reforms that would make the enforcement mechanism more rigorous, such as authorizing collective retaliation against offending members, or granting WTO rules direct effect in domestic courts". 39 Consequently, in some cases WTO DSB decisions (rulings and recommendations) were not being perfomed and implemented and over those disobedience and the non-compliance threre was no WTO sanctions can be applied.
In some cases of non-compliance with the WTO DSB, which a developing country won against a developed country, the WTO DSB's decision tend to be an international soft law norm, because it could not be enforced due to the lack of power belong to the winning developing country to force the losing developed country. In those case the WTO judicial dispute settlement system were not effective as a mean of WTO laws enforcement system. Consequently, developed countries which did not comply with the WTO DSB's decision in WTO dispute against developing countries oftenly were not be sanctioned. It will lead to the disobedience of the WTO laws and regulations.
The disobedience of the WTO laws and regulations will lead state members of the WTO prefer to take unilateral trade sanctions against the other state which violated WTO laws. This situation will lead trade war among the WTO members and this trade war will endanger international economic and trade cooperations/relations based on the mutually advantages and principle of justice. Moreover, this situation will caused developing countries and Least Developed Countries suffer of economic losses and injustice in some international trade and economic relations.
The weakness of the WTO judicial system and mechanism make a contrainst in the WTO laws enforcement 40 and in achieving the object of the WTO dispute settlement system. The prime object and purpose of the WTO dispute settlement system is the prompt settlement dispute between WTO members concerning their respective rights 39 Movsesian, M.L. (2003) . and obligations under WTO laws. 41 Furthermore, the weakness of the judicial system of the WTO will contrainst the achievement of WTO's goals, particularly the effort to enhance the World economic wellfare through trade liberalization. 42 Considering the weaknesses of the WTO judicial dispute settlement system, there sould be some modifications and improvement. A strong, credible, independent, fair, and transparent judicial system should be established for enhancing the enforcement of the WTO laws and regulations. The WTO judicial dispute settlement should be able to protect every rights of the WTO members based on the the WTO agreement, especially when the rights are impaired due to the violation of the WTO regulations done by another member.
The WTO judicial body should be named the WTO Court or WTO Tribunal, comprises of the WTO First Court/Tribunal and the WTO Appellate Court/Tribunal, which respectively has authority to make an independent and binding decision in settling WTO disputes. Beside the WTO Court/Tribunal, the WTO should also establish a permanent WTO Arbitration Tribunal completed with an WTO arbitration rules as alternative of WTO dispute settlement.
As a judicial decision, the decision of WTO judicial organ should be interpretated as international hard law norms and can be enforced by international law enforcement mechanism. For the purpose of WTO judicial decisions enforcement, WTO should establish effective sanctions against the non compliance with the decisions. Concerning with the role of sanctions in the implementation of WTO judicial decision, Sungjoon Cho admittedly, sanctions may play a certain role in inducing compliance with the WTO rules through the deterrence of similar violations in the future, beyond a narrower remedial role of penalties or satisfaction." 43 The WTO also should establish an organ which has authority to apply sanctions to the WTO member which does not comply with the WTO judicial decision. The WTO can follow the enforcement of ICJ's decision model, which the United Nations Security Council can take some actions in the implementation of the ICJ's decisions. Some proposals of sanctions against the non compliance with the WTO DSB decisions (rullings and recommendations) have been made by some WTO members and some writers. Monetary compensations or financial sanctions and collective retaliation are sanctions proposed by most writers and WTO members.
The idea of monetary compensation as a sanction against the non compliance with the WTO/GATT judicial decision had been proposed by some developing countries far before the establishment of the WTO, but unfortunately this proposal was not accepted in the Uruguay Round Negotiation. Concerning with this proposal, Robert E. Hudec, 44 said that the most important challenge to the exclusively forward-looking view of GATT remedies was a 1965 effort by GATT developing countries to add monetary compensation to the list of dispute settlement remedies. According to Asim Imdad Ali the monetary compensatioan proposal is similar with the monetary compensation applied in the European Community. Based on the Treaty on Establishment of the European Community, monetary compensation will be applied toward the European Community member which failed to implement the decision made by the European Tribunal. 45 Beside monetery compensation, the proposal of collective retaliation as a sanction against the non compliance with the WTO judicial decision, also had been made by some developing countries in the same time with the proposal of monetary compensation. The 1965 developing country proposals on remedies included a proposal calling for collective retaliation. 46 For applying sanctions against the non-compliance with the WTO judicial decisions, WTO should take some actions which are needed to forced the implementation of the decision by the losing respondent. In applying the sanctions, the WTO also should make some cooperations with some organs of the United Nations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the United Nations Security Council. For examples, in applying monetary compensantion as a sanction of the non compliance with the WTO judicial decision, the WTO can make cooperations with the IMF and the World Bank 47 , and in applying collective retaliation the WTO can make cooperations with the United Nations Security Council.
Beside monetary compensation and collective retaliation the WTO also should prohibit the WTO member which failed to implement the WTO judicial decision to make a complain before the WTO DSB for at least until the member fulfill it's obligation to implement the decision. Furthermore, the WTO should make a black list of members which did not comply with the WTO judicial decisions. WTO also should make a declaration to condemn the non compliance with the WTO judicial decisions.
Conclusion
The absence of effective sanctions against the non compliance with the WTO DSB's decision (rulings and recommendetions) leads to the interpretation of the rulings and recommendations are international soft law norms which are not legally binding. It can decrease the credibility of the WTO dispute settlement system and can cause the disobedience to the WTO Agreement. As judicial decision, the WTO DSB's decision (rulings and recommendations) should be interpreted and regarded as international hard law norms, and it should be able to be enforced by international law sanctions.
The judicial dispute settlement system of the WTO should be improved by establishing independent, impartial, fair and transparent WTO judiciary organ and procedure. 
